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Summary
The article deals with the conflict as an indispensable element of democracy 
and politics from the perspective of Carl Schmitt’s concept of the political. Ac-
cording to Schmitt, the specific criterion of the political is to be found in the 
friend-enemy distinction. Denoting the utmost degree of association and disso-
ciation, it corresponds to other antitheses (good-evil, beautiful-ugly, profitable-
non-profitable, etc.), but is independent of them and should not be mistaken 
for them. Understood in this way, the political for Schmitt has an existential 
meaning, as it characterizes human life as such and as conflict cannot be solved 
in advance through some general norm or by a neutral third party. Although 
Schmitt’s definition seems to limit the proper phenomenon of the political to 
the state – which as political unity monopolizes the friend-enemy relationship 
and excludes enmity from its domestic affairs – the author finds in Schmitt’s 
“secondary concepts of the political” the possibility to think the conflict as the 
principle of domestic politics as well. This would mean to accept antagonism 
as inevitable and legitimate, without moral or other disqualification of the op-
ponent, and to subdue conflict to the rules of political quarrel and debate. In 
the second part of the article, the author discusses Schmitt’s critique of liberal-
ism. Although at first sight liberalism seems to be a negation of the political, 
in the last instance it not only fails to elude the political, but exacerbates and 
intensifies the conflict. By presenting its claims as universal, it disavows its 
adversaries as “enemies of humanity”, falling in this way victim to political 
hypocrisies. In the last part of the article, the author considers some similarities 
between Schmitt’s and Hannah Arendt’s understanding of the political. Despite 
all differences between them, these can be noticed in Arendt’s treatment of the 
Dreyfus Affair in the Origins of Totalitarianism, where she makes clear that 
conflict is not only a threat to the “political entity”, but can also be the way in 
which that entity is saved. 
Keywords: Carl Schmitt, Political, Friend-Enemy Distinction, Conflict, Libe-
ralism, Hannah Arendt, Dreyfus Affair
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Introduction
I will begin my article by mentioning two occurrences of the recent past in Germa-
ny. First: Since the German Chancellor Angela Merkel opened the German borders 
in September 2015 for refugees from Syria and other parts of the world, an intensive 
debate on migration and refugee policies seems to split the German public and poli-
tics. Most parties and also most of the media – and, not to forget, the Catholic and 
the Protestant Church likewise – are advocating the generous immigration policy of 
Angela Merkel, while only the AfD party, the “Alternative for Germany”, not repre-
sented in the parliament, the Bundestag and the Christian Social Union, CSU, ironi-
cally forming itself a part of the government, and some online platforms are oppos-
ing this policy. The debate, however, is an asymmetric one, since the supporters of 
Merkel’s position criticize their opponents in the following way: first, demands for 
closing the borders and for a strong limitation of immigration are considered to be 
contra legem, and prohibited by human rights and international conventions like 
the Refugee Convention. Second, claiming for themselves a superior moral position 
based on an “ethics of humanity”, Merkel’s supporters usually declare the refusal 
of the admittance of immigrants and refugees as immoral, as founded in egoism, 
nationalism, chauvinism or racialism.
Some observers, however, are considering this criticism to be an illegitimate 
attempt to narrow the scope of political debate. They emphasize that immigration 
is not a legal or moral, but first a political question. In particular, the tendency to 
qualify one’s opponents as immoral is suspected to jeopardise the liberty of speech 
in public that the Ancient Greeks called Parrhesia and what is commonly seen as 
an indispensable element of democracy. Thereby it has been suggested that the po-
litical is partially at odds with moral and law, and – as one might add – to truth – 
as Hannah Arendt has remarked in an article on Truth and Politics (Arendt, 1977: 
227). Why is this? Obviously, politics or “the political” seems to be associated with 
some sort of conflict which is not asymmetric like that between good and evil, right 
and wrong, legal and illegal or true and false.
The second occurrence happened on June, 16th last year, when former German 
chancellor Helmut Kohl died. All over the place Kohl was honoured as a “great 
European” and praised for his merits for the German unity and the European Uni-
fication. But, an article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the most influen-
tial German newspaper, honoured Kohl as Der Kanzler der Zwietracht, that is: the 
Chancellor of discord, or – of conflict. And indeed, this is a sound characterisation 
of Helmut Kohl. For, as the author emphasizes, Kohl was always prone to using a 
“rhetoric of polarisation” and during his political life he, a conservative politician, 
always showed a strong hostility against socialists and Social Democrats. But, on 
the other side, Kohl did not at all regard it illegitimate to be a socialist. And while 
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he was determined to conflict with the socialists, he expected unanimity and uncon-
ditional loyalty in his own party. Opponents he treated as “traitors” and searched to 
deprive them of all influence on the party’s decisions. What does this imply? The 
author declares that no one understood better than Kohl the “fundamental law of 
parliamentary democracy”: “What is regarded to be the common welfare, in demo-
cracy has to be determined by ‘organized conflict’” (Bahners, 2017).
The question raised by these examples is: Is conflict an indispensable element 
not only of democracy but of politics as a whole? Or is it on the contrary an evil we 
should avoid wherever it is possible? Should we follow the opinion of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau who declares in his Social Contract that “long debates, dissension, and 
disorder are a sign that particular interests are in the ascendant and the state in de-
cline” (Rousseau, 1994: IV, 2) and who holds universal consent as a prerequisite of 
a good state, which he characterizes in this way: “The first man to propose them 
[laws] merely puts into words something that all have felt already. There is never 
any question of vote-catching or speech-making in order to make it a law to do what 
everyone has already resolved that he will do himself, once he is sure that others 
will do the same” (ibid.: IV, 1).
In the following section, I shall deal with a thinker who estimates conflict not 
only an indispensable element of “the political”, but, moreover, its very criterion. 
This thinker is Carl Schmitt. Without exaggeration, one can call Carl Schmitt the 
most notable – and also the most notorious – jurisprudent in 20th century Germany. 
Schmitt, born in 1888, died in 1985, was a man of the political right.
Schmitt was attached to conflict in a specific way, partly by personal reasons 
– he was a brilliant scholar with strong political inclinations – and partly by his so-
cial position. Schmitt was a catholic and had to excel in a university dominated by a 
protestant atmosphere. This situation was of crucial importance, since the Church in 
“Vaticanum I” had definitely adopted a hostile attitude against the modern secular 
world, and, in particular, against modern democracy. The Church’s members were 
requested to limit their intercourse with non-Catholics to the absolute necessary; 
they were asked to organize their own trade unions, associations and parties – thus 
efforts had been made to establish what we today might call a “parallel society”. 
Hence, being a Catholic, Schmitt’s thinking was deeply rooted in the 19th cen-
tury philosophy of counter revolution, namely in that of the Spanish diplomat Juan 
Donoso Cortés (1809-1853) on whom I will dwell shortly. Cortés points out in his 
Essay on Catholicism, Liberalism and Socialism that only a catholic monarchy is 
suitable for the European countries. His argumentation, however, is not theological 
but sociological, since Cortés is convinced that every reign, society and state can 
only be stable through maintaining its religious foundation – so the Roman Em-
pire in the Roman religion and the European states in Christianity. And, to put it 
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simply, like Christ is a heavenly king ruling the world as a whole, European mon-
archs should reign the state on earth. Cortés maintained that the catholic principle 
was challenged by atheist socialism (represented for Cortés by Pierre-Joseph Prou-
dhon), and Europe would have to make a decision between the two, which for Cor-
tés was a decision between Christ and Barabbas. Liberalism, however, for Cortés is 
a political position which seeks to avoid this kind of decision (Cortés, 2017, Book 
2, Chap. VIII). As Carl Schmitt puts it later in referring to Cortés, liberalism, con-
fronted with the alternative “Christ or Barabbas”, will bring forward a motion of 
postponement, prorogation or will install an inquiry commission (Schmitt, 1985: 
62). While Cortés on the one side respects socialism as his deadly adversary, he, at 
the same time, despises Liberalism for its indecisiveness.
Although Schmitt, a Catholic himself, is not at all bothered with the estab-
lishment of a catholic monarchy, he adopts Cortés’ decisionism. In 1922, in Politi-
cal Theology, he states the decision regarding the state of emergency as the main 
criterion of sovereign power (ibid.: 5). Every political order, Schmitt declares, is 
founded in this decision and not in natural or positive law. Before there is law, there 
must exist an order created by sovereign decision (ibid.: 10). And, as we shall see, 
Schmitt’s book The Concept of the Political will present a variation of this deci-
sionism.
Schmitt also adopts from Cortés the hostility against liberalism. But while 
Schmitt emphasizes liberalism’s indecisiveness and its inclination to “eternal dis-
cussion”, he at the same time asserts that the liberal essentials of parliamentary and 
public discussion have lost their proper function in modern mass democracy. Libe-
ral principles have become masks of tendencies which are in effect illiberal – hence 
Schmitt regards the discussion in a modern parliament only as a disguise of con-
flicts between powerful interest groups which are solved elsewhere, but not in par-
liament. Therefore, Schmitt says, debates in a modern parliament look as if some-
one had painted red a central heating in order to evoke the impression of burning 
fire (Schmitt, 2000: 6). This is the diagnosis he gave in his 1923 writing The Crisis 
of Parliamentary Democracy; in fact, it differs little from Marxist criticism of par-
liamentary democracy, and this affinity Schmitt is eager to expose. For this reason, 
the text of The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy has inaugurated a Schmittian-
ism of the political left.
Being a catholic conservative who respected the Marxist tradition of political 
thinking, Schmitt had little confidence in the German republic of Weimar. In 1932, 
he advocated a dictatorship of the Reichspräsident in order to suppress the aspira-
tions of both Nazis and Communists. After Hitler’s takeover Schmitt curried favour 
with the victorious national socialists and tried to exert some influence on their 
politics; this attempt, however, proved to be a complete failure. Nonetheless, after 
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the war he was imprisoned by the Americans and lost his position as a professor of 
law at German university. He retired to his hometown Plettenberg in the province 
of Westphalia, which he, alluding to Machiavelli’s exile from Florence, called his 
“San Casciano”.
The Concept of the Political
I shall begin by exposing the three main propositions of Schmitt’s book. 
1. The criterion of the political is the friend-enemy distinction. This distinc-
tion or antagonism signifies the most intensive grade of association or dissociation, 
which dissociation, in principle, can always entail a deadly conflict.
2. The political, identified by this criterion, is defining the state in double re-
spect. A) The state is a unit monopolizing the friend-enemy distinction: only the 
state may have an enemy, and no domestic group may have the state’s enemy as 
friend.
3. B) The state is a state only if it prevents all domestic conflicts from becom-
ing a friend-enemy antagonism in its proper sense.
Schmitt’s monograph The Concept of the Political was published first in 1927 
and is the most renowned of Schmitt’s writings; it is of central importance for his 
understanding of politics and state. And, although Schmitt likes to emphasize his 
catholic faith, this book marks a break with the catholic tradition of political think-
ing which has its root in Aristotle.
The Aristotelian tradition in political thinking always supposed a unity of eth-
ics and politics – in the sense that politics is closely limited by and dependent on 
some general ethics. This holds for Aristotle and for Thomas Aquinas likewise. St. 
Thomas even extended that unity also to the field of war in unfolding the doctrine 
of the just war. Modern political thinking founded by Machiavelli, however, strictly 
tried to dissolve that unity of ethics and politics and asserted some sort of autonomy 
and independence of the political sphere from general ethical issues. This Machi-
avellian line of thinking, represented by Thomas Hobbes, Baruch de Spinoza and 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (although Hegel in that case, according to Schmitt, 
also shows his “double face”), was uncontested. It was rejected most directly by 
Immanuel Kant, who in his book on Perpetual Peace defined politics “as the ap-
plied doctrine of right” (Kant, 2006: 94), in order to show that, ultimately, there 
cannot exist any conflict between morality and politics. In our times, an indepen-
dence of the political sphere from ethical issues has been denied by John Rawls, 
whose Theory of Justice has been widely regarded as a revival of political philo-
sophy.
Without any doubt, The Concept of the Political is part of the Machiavellian 
tradition. Like Machiavelli, Schmitt conceives the political as a specific sphere of 
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human existence, independent from ethics and also from economics. Schmitt in-
tends to establish a criterion of the political. This criterion, however, cannot be seen 
in the preservation of state power and state’s existence, since, as Schmitt declares 
in the first sentence of his book: “The concept of the state presupposes the concept 
of the political” (Schmitt, 2007: 19). The criterion Schmitt proposes is the friend-
enemy distinction. “The specific political distinction to which political actions and 
motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy. This provides a defini-
tion in the sense of a criterion and not as an exhaustive definition or an indicative 
of substantial content. Insofar as it is not derived from other criteria, the antithesis 
of friend and enemy corresponds to the relatively independent criteria of other anti-
theses: good and evil in the moral sphere, beautiful and ugly in the aesthetic sphere, 
and so on. In any event it is independent, not in the sense of a distinct new domain, 
but in that it can neither be based on any one antithesis or any combination of other 
antitheses, nor can it be traced to these. If the antithesis of good and evil is not sim-
ply identical with that of beautiful and ugly, profitable and unprofitable, and can-
not be directly reduced to the others, then the antithesis of friend and enemy must 
even less be confused with or mistaken for the others. The distinction of friend and 
enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an asso-
ciation or dissociation. [...] The political enemy need not to be morally evil or aes-
thetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be 
advantageous to engage with him in business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, 
the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in an especially 
intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case 
conflicts with him are possible. These [conflicts] can neither be decided by a previ-
ously determined general norm nor by the judgment of a disinterested and therefore 
neutral third party” (ibid.: 26-27).1
So, “enemy” does not mean simply something like opponent, adversary, rival or 
economic competitor. Standing above all norms and “neutral third party” judgments, 
the friend-enemy antithesis may always lead to a deadly conflict, since the enemy 
is denying my own being by his pure existence. Therefore, Schmitt conceives the 
friend-enemy antithesis as something “existential”, which characterizes human life 
as such. And if the friend-enemy antithesis is the essence of the Political, the Politi-
cal has an existential meaning for us. “From this most extreme possibility [of real 
combat] human life derives its specifically political tension” (ibid.: 35).
But why does Schmitt speak of “political tension”? Is every real combat po-
litical? Would Schmitt tell us, for example, that the bellum omnium contra omnes 
1 Since The Concept of the Political only offers a criterion, a substantial concept or notion of the 
political might well include something like “justice” or “search for the common good”. Hence 
one could say that the title of Schmitt’s book is somewhat misleading.
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in a fictitious Hobbesian state of nature is a political conflict? Certainly, he would 
not. Since Schmitt emphasizes that the enemy in question is always the “public ene-
my” (hostis), not the private (inimicus) (ibid.: 28). But what does “public” mean? Of 
course, Schmitt cannot answer that public is that what is political, and subsequently 
define the political by the public, since this would imply a circular reasoning. The 
solution to this difficult question lies in the fact that the friend-enemy antithesis 
takes form not only in real enmity, but also in real friendship.2 By friendship can be 
formed a collectivity of men. So, Schmitt concludes that the fighters in combat are 
collectivities. “An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, a fighting collecti-
vity of people confronts a similar collectivity.” And the notion “public” is strongly 
related to such a collectivity: “The enemy is solely the public enemy, because every-
thing that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to a whole na-
tion, becomes public by virtue of such relationship” (ibid.).
That very collectivity, in some way emerging from the friend-enemy relation-
ship, is the state. The state is the political unit of a people or of a nation. The state is 
“in the decisive case the ultimate authority” (ibid.: 20). The state monopolizes the 
friend-enemy relationship, for only the state can have an exterior political enemy, 
while it excludes such enmity from its domestic affairs. The ultimate form of such 
enmity is war, in the sense of the law of nations. This, however, does not mean that 
war would be the end to which politics should aim. Schmitt emphasizes that his 
definition of the political is not bellicist or militarist, and he would not at all deny 
that “the politically reasonable course [could] reside in avoiding war” (ibid.: 33). 
War is only an always menacing possibility of the political, not its aim or destina-
tion. The state as the political unity is also sovereign in deciding on the “case of 
emergency”. Schmitt says of the state as the “decisive grouping”: “This grouping is 
therefore always the decisive human grouping, the political entity. If such an entity 
exists at all, it is always the decisive entity, and it is sovereign in the sense that the 
decision about the critical situation, even if it is the exception, must always neces-
sarily reside there” (ibid.: 38).
The state has to make “the decision about the critical situation” also in respect 
to its domestic affairs. These affairs typically are characterized by conflicts be-
tween, for example, religious, economic or ethnic groups. “Every religious, moral, 
economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms into a political one if it is suffi-
ciently strong to group human beings effectively according to friend and enemy” 
(ibid.: 37). Such antitheses must not reach the intensity of the political friend-enemy 
antithesis; otherwise the existence of the state, the political unity, is at stake. In re-
spect to Marxist communist parties Schmitt remarks: “Were it possible to group all 
2 On friendship Schmitt has little to say; at least, he is rather implicit on that matter.
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mankind in the proletarian and bourgeois antithesis, as friend and enemy in capital-
ist states, and if, in the process, all other friend-and-enemy groupings were to dis-
appear [...], then the political identity is destroyed” (ibid.: 38). Therefore, the state 
has also to decide about the “domestic enemy”, which is the potential enemy in civil 
war. The state has to prevent civil war at all costs for the sake of its own existence.
What is now to be said about the political? It has its own antagonistic structure, 
but it has not its own area – like the opposition of good and evil belong to morals, 
profitable and unprofitable to economy, beautiful and ugly to aesthetics, true and 
false to science and so on. The term “political” denotes only an ultimate intensity 
of possible conflict. But the political means not only the utmost degree of intensity 
of dissociation, but also of association. The strongest association in this sense is the 
political unity, the state. So, we can conclude: the friend-enemy distinction and no-
tion of political unity in Schmitt are Categories of Reflexion in the sense of Hegel’s 
Science of Logic. Such Categories of Reflexion like essence and appearance, form 
and matter, cause and effect are characterized by the fact that none of them can be 
thought of without its specific opposite. There is no friend without enemy, no ene-
my without political unity, which Aristotle, and also Schmitt, as I would like to sup-
pose, conceive as a structure of friendship.
The conception of friend and enemy in the political leads to another point. The 
opposition of good and evil, profitable and unprofitable, beautiful and ugly, true and 
false is always asymmetric, since it is one of valuation and devaluation. The good, 
the profitable and the beautiful are all in some respect better than their relative op-
posites – in the sense that we, normally, would always prefer them to the evil, the 
unprofitable and the ugly. This does not hold, however, for the friend-enemy dis-
tinction. The enemy, insofar he is the enemy, is not worse in any sense than the 
friend or my own collectivity. This is a key point in Schmitt’s thought which in par-
ticular let him reject the doctrine of the just war. For, according to that doctrine, the 
belligerent must have a just cause, which seems to imply that his enemy is unjust 
or guilty.3 Schmitt is convinced that a confusion of such valuations with the politi-
cal would inevitably lead to corruption of all political categories. I will come back 
to that point later.
Political Controversy
The Concept of the Political, at first sight, seems to limit the proper phenomenon 
of the political to politics between the states, the political unities. As we have seen, 
“The endeavour of a normal state consists above all in assuring total peace within 
3 Aquinas, S. Theol II-II, q. 40, a. 1: Secundo requiritur causa justa; ut scilicet illi, qui impug-
nantur, propter aliquam culpam impugnationem mereantur.
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the state and its territory” (ibid.: 46). In order to achieve peace, the state must pre-
vent that interior conflicts between different groups reach the intensity of a proper 
friend-enemy antagonism. In respect to a state’s domestic affairs, one may therefore 
speak of “secondary concepts of the political”, like “religious, educational, com-
munal, social policy”. But even if these are “secondary concepts”, they are also 
concepts of the political. According to Schmitt, “this becomes evident [...] by two 
obvious phenomena. First, all political concepts, images, and terms have a polemi-
cal meaning” (ibid.: 30). And second, all domestic political controversies may even-
tually intensify in a way that they are endangering the political unity of the state 
and end up in civil war (ibid.: 32). Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, a former judge at 
German Constitutional Court, gives an example of such a controversy in the Ger-
man Reich and in Prussia in the 1870s and 80s, the so-called Kulturkampf between 
the Catholic Church and the Bismarck-Administration, which both parties broke up 
before it ended in dissolution of the state or civil war (cf. Böckenförde, 1991: 347).
The principle of the political is, therefore, conflict. This has two implications. 
First: “A world state which embraces the entire globe and all of humanity cannot 
exist” (Schmitt, 2007: 53), and second: also in domestic politics one should not ex-
pect an encompassing consent. Political dissent is not at all transitory, because it is 
not a dissent in which the opponents are good or evil, right or wrong. From this, one 
might derive some kind of “ethics of politics”: This ethics simply consists in con-
sidering the friend-enemy antagonism as legitimate, in not condemning the enemy 
or nourish hatred against him, and in accepting the inevitability of that antagonism, 
while, at the same time, striving to subdue this antagonism to certain rules – be that 
rules of war or of political quarrel and debate.
Liberalism
This ethics of the political, however, is at odds with the practice and doctrine of 
liberalism. But, is there something like “political liberalism” at all? According to 
Schmitt, there is not, since the question “whether a specific political idea can be de-
rived from the pure and consequent concept of liberalism” “is to be denied” (ibid.: 
69-70). Referring to liberalism, “the individual must remain terminus a quo and 
terminus ad quem” (ibid.: 70-71), and its only purpose consists in “protecting in-
dividual freedom and private property” (ibid.: 70). However: “In case of need, the 
political entity must demand the sacrifice of life. Such a demand is in no way justi-
fiable by the individualism of liberal thought” (ibid.: 71). The activity of state and 
government for liberalism is “confined to securing the conditions for liberty and 
eliminating infringements on freedom” (ibid.).
What is wrong with liberalism? Individual freedom and private property are le-
gitimate purposes, but liberalism denies the existentiality of conflict and the friend-
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enemy antagonism. In his earlier writings, Schmitt condemned liberalism in line 
with Cortés as striving to avoid every decision by “perpetual discussion”, but now 
he accuses liberalism of the “negation of the political” (ibid.: 70). “Liberal con-
cepts typically move between ethics (intellectuality) and economics (trade)” (ibid.). 
“Thus the political concept of battle in liberal thought becomes competition in the 
domain of economics and discussion in the intellectual realm. Instead of a clear 
distinction between the two different states, that of war and of peace, there appears 
the dynamic of perpetual competition and perpetual discussion. The state turns into 
society: on the ethical-intellectual side into an ideological humanitarian conception 
of humanity, and on the other into an economic-technical system of production and 
traffic” (ibid.: 71-72). So liberalism has changed and degenerated “all political con-
ceptions” (ibid.: 69).
But, to make things complicated – although liberalism is a “negation of the po-
litical”, it at the same time “has failed to elude the political” (ibid.). In the liberal 
“negation of the political”, in denying or attempting to ban existential conflict from 
politics liberalism does not lessen, but on the contrary exacerbates such conflict. In 
struggling for peace, freedom and humanity liberalism disavows its enemy or ad-
versary in political quarrel and debate. Liberalism establishes an asymmetry in po-
litical conflict by devaluation of adversary positions. In the 19th century, it created 
a scheme of antagonisms:
Freedom, progress and reason                against Feudalism, reaction and force
Economy, industry and technology        against State, war and politics
Parliamentarianism                                 against Dictatorship
So, liberalism presents itself as part of a friend-enemy antagonism in which the 
enemy appears to be in some respect evil. Liberalism, according to Schmitt, claims 
to be in a morally superior position.
This also holds in international affairs, especially respecting war. The “polarity 
of ethical pathos and economic calculation”, which is typical for liberalism, Schmitt 
also finds in “the Peace of Versailles” after the First World War. In declaring the Ger-
man Reich responsible “for all war damages”, the Versailles treaty “establishes a 
foundation for a juridic and moral value judgment”, which should justify the claim 
for “reparations, i.e., a continuous and unlimited economic exploitation of the van-
quished” (ibid.: 73). Liberalism, in Schmitt’s view, perverts the political by politici-
sation of universal moral principles such as “humanity”. Thus, however, “a particu-
lar [fighting] state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its opponent”, and the 
concept of humanity proves to be “an especially useful ideological instrument of im-
perialist expansion”. Schmitt resumes: “Whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat. 
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To confiscate the word humanity [...] has certain incalculable effects, such as deny-
ing the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of hu-
manity; and a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity” (ibid.: 54).
As Schmitt tells us, the economist Joseph Schumpeter claimed the methods of 
liberal politics to be “essentially unwarlike”. But, is liberalism “essentially unwar-
like”, Schmitt asks. “Essentially unwarlike is [only] the terminology based on the 
essence of liberal ideology” (ibid.: 78). An imperialism inspired by liberalism will 
always try first to apply “its economic means, e.g. terminating credit, embargoing 
raw materials, destroying the currency of others, and so on”, but eventually will re-
sort to “sufficient technical means to bring violent death”. But “For the application 
of such means, a new and essentially pacifist vocabulary has been created. War is 
condemned but executions, sanctions, punitive expeditions, pacifications, protec-
tion of treaties, international police, and measures to assure peace remain. The ad-
versary is thus no longer called an enemy but a disturber of peace and is thereby 
designated to be an outlaw of humanity” (ibid.: 79).
Liberalism, as Schmitt puts it, regards state and politics as legitimate only if 
they serve the individual’s private purposes. Liberalism is therefore not a contempt-
ible political ideology of the bourgeoisie or of the classa discuditora, as according to 
Donoso Cortés, but the real adversary of the political. The political, characterized by 
the friend-enemy antagonism, is founded in the human condition, and in denying it, 
liberalism is unable to “escape the logic of the political” (ibid.). Instead of avoiding 
conflict, liberalism is intensifying and exacerbating it, thereby perverting the politi-
cal. Using a non-political language of morals and peace, liberalism falls victim to po-
litical hypocrisy. According to Hannah Arendt, hypocrisy is a capital vice in politics.
It may be interesting to compare Schmitt’s concept of the political with that of 
Hannah Arendt, which reveals a further aspect of the political: Political conflict in 
domestic affairs is not only a possible menace to the political unity and therefore 
tolerable only within certain limits, but sometimes even helpful to save that political 
unity. That is shown in an exemplary manner by Hannah Arendt.
Hannah Arendt and the Dreyfus Affair
In respect of political conflict, there exist some significant similarities between 
Schmitt’s and Hannah Arendt’s concept of the political. Despite obvious differences 
between them – Arendt would never explicate the political by referring to violence 
and war – their conceptions have something in common. To Arendt, as to Schmitt, 
the notion of the political also denotes an existential dimension of mankind. Arendt 
also would certainly refuse to conceive politics primarily as a search for the com-
mon good or common welfare, or as “an applied doctrine of right” in a Kantian 
manner. According to Arendt’s anthropology man is the acting animal, the animal 
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agens. Acting, however, essentially does not consist in pursuing certain purposes 
or ends, but rather in the self-revealing of the acting person and the performing of 
deeds that are apt to change the world in a certain respect. Such deeds are not only 
worth remembering and constitute human history; moreover, by these deeds hu-
mans “created a human world, a human reality” (Arendt, 2017: 251). Without deeds 
worth remembering and without history, as Arendt declares in a meditation on Jo-
seph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, human beings are not really human beings; “they 
behaved like a part of nature”, for whom nature “had remained, in all its majesty, 
the only overwhelming reality – compared to which they appeared to be phantoms, 
unreal and ghostlike” (ibid.).
In Arendt’s conception of politics or of the political, conflict is no element. But, 
in my opinion, in the most impressive example she gives of political action, conflict 
plays an important role. This example is Arendt’s analysis of the so-called Dreyfus 
Affair she gives in her book on The Origins of Totalitarianism.
“Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer of the French General Staff, was accused and 
convicted of espionage for Germany. The verdict, lifelong deportation to Devil’s 
Island, was unanimously adopted” (ibid.: 115). According to Arendt, Alfred Drey-
fus became the central character not only in an anti-Semitic campaign, but also in 
efforts of the Catholic Church to restore its lost political power, and of the army, 
which planned to “gain the upper hand over the corrupt civil power” and to pave the 
way “for a bloodless coup d’état” (ibid.: 141). So, the Dreyfus Affair finally turned 
out to be an attack of “Army and Clergy against the Republic” (ibid.: 129), in which 
combat the hero was not Dreyfus, but Georges Clemenceau (ibid.: 123), who later 
became prime minister.
Why Clemenceau? Clemenceau, editor of the newspaper L’Aurore, realized 
the dimension of the Dreyfus case. He was not only convinced that Dreyfus was 
innocent, but also that “the republic [was] in danger” (ibid.: 142). Therefore “Cle-
menceau’s approach [...] was not directed against a particular miscarriage of justice, 
but was based upon such ‘abstract’ ideas as justice, liberty, and civic virtue” (ibid.). 
These general concepts proved to have indeed a polemic meaning. Clemenceau 
was able to convince his followers, the “Dreyfusards”, “that an infringement of the 
rights of one man was an infringement of the rights of all” (ibid.: 147). Clemenceau 
and the “Dreyfusards” “finally succeeded in splitting every class, even every family 
in France into factions over the Dreyfus issue” (ibid.: 148).
Georges Clemenceau and Émile Zola stirred up conflict, but also revealed that 
there was a fundamental conflict concerning the republic, the political entity, itself. 
In Arendt’s view, they revealed also the people, in the political sense of populus, in 
its true shape. What is the people? Arendt says: The people in its true shape is re-
presented by the citizens who hear the call of the patriots in the hour of danger and 
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emergency and who can “rid” this call of all societal commitments.4 “They were a 
mixture of diverse elements: men as far apart as Zola and Péguy or Jaurès and Pic-
quart, men who on the morrow would part company and go their separate ways. 
‘They come from political parties and religious communities who have nothing in 
common, who are even in conflict with each other... Those men do not know each 
other. They have fought and on occasion they will fight again. Do not deceive your-
selves: those are the “elite” of the French democracy’” (ibid.: 148-149). And in re-
spect to those as the true representatives of the people, Arendt says, though only 
in the German version: It would not have been hubris, but simply the truth, if Cle-
menceau had regarded himself to be the voice of the people (which he did not). Al-
though army and clergy failed at last in achieving their aims, the affair did not end 
with a victory of the Dreyfusards. There was no retrial of Dreyfus, but only an am-
biguous pardon and an even more ambiguous amnesty, lumping together “men of 
honour and hoodlums” (ibid.: 155). However, as Arendt puts it, Jacobine patriotism, 
which regarded human rights always as part of the French nation’s glory, was to save 
France from the disgrace of a domestic fascism (only in the German version, p. 170).
Like Schmitt, Hannah Arendt holds that the political is something superior to 
all societal commitments and interests. It induces men to fight (although not with 
violence and weapons). And, we may conclude: Arendt makes clear that conflict in 
domestic politics is not only a menace to the “political entity”, the republic, but can 
also be a way in which that political entity is defended and saved.
Conclusion
Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction is a criterion, not an essential definition of the 
political. And to me, it seems convincing to link sovereignty of the political unity 
and the friend-enemy distinction. Otherwise, an essential definition of the political 
would have to say something about the nature of political unity, with other words, 
not only about enmity, but also about friendship, seen in European political thought 
since the time of Aristotle as the basis of citizenship. Schmitt, however, has little to 
tell us on this topic, and so the title of his book appears to be partially misleading.
On the other side, Schmitt is emphasizing rightly the polemic character of po-
litical notions used in public discussion. But this polemic character is not only a 
threat to political unity, but, as Hannah Arendt has shown, sharp conflicts in public 
discussion also sometimes may foster that very unity. Referring to such polemic 
terms in debate, in Bernard Shaw’s play Saint Joan (Scene IV) the Earl of Warwick 
declares that “they are only east and west views of the same thing” (Shaw, 1934: 
983), pointing not at the dividing potential of “east and west”, but at the uniting 
force of “the same thing” which is, in politics, the common good.
4 This statement is to be found only in the German version of Arendt’s book (Arendt, 1993: 198).
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